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THE ISCIP ANALYST 
Volume 15, Number 13 (June 25, 2009) 
 
Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
Contrivances of power 
The shock of economic crisis, particularly the dramatic dip in oil prices, has 
produced entirely foreseeable consequences for Russia's ruling diarchy and its 
linked sets of apparatchiki, and yet Russia's political elite seems ill-prepared to 
confront either the economic challenges or those subsequent risks to the current 
governing system.  The crisis has served to exacerbate trends seen likely to 
develop as a result of the odd structure of authority contrived by the former and 
current presidents; the conjecture over fissures between president and prime 
minister seems sharper with increasingly gloomy economic statistics.  Concern 
with the local impact of an international financial slump raises pointed questions 
about the ability of the prime minister to appear effective in combating a problem 
that he can do little to control.   
 
Whether by contrived design or as part of a personal campaign to differentiate 
himself from his predecessor, (1) President Medvedev has spoken out on the 
need for reform, and particularly for anti-corruption measures (presumably to 
weed out corrupt members of Putin's elite), and he has spoken to the opposition, 
or at least to less than regime-friendly newspapers, such as Novaya gazeta, in 
an apparent effort to bolster a more western-style liberal image. 
 
Despite attention focused on the putative cracks in the Putin-Medvedev tandem, 
the quirky political design apparently is perceived as relatively secure.   More 
than one year after Medvedev's inauguration, polls reveal a solid 63% of the 
Russian population view the tandem power system as stable.  Perhaps more 
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tellingly, a significant 69% still identify Putin as the "most powerful and influential 
politician." (2) 
 
While popular perceptions are significant, the import of conjecture over diarchical 
relations rests primarily within the realm of Russia's political elite.  Any sense that 
there might be, in fact, two masters to attend could grind even necessary 
bureaucratic activity to a halt as ambitious apparatchiki wait for a clear signal of 
strength (and, assuming a struggle between the power centers, perhaps an overt 
victory of one) before proceeding in any direction.  It may be instructive that 
some of the more intense analytical speculation currently is concerned with 
whether or not Medvedev has made inroads in winning over former "Putin men" 
to his camp. (3) Speculation over a re-division of personnel assets can evoke a 
remarkably sudden shift in authority within a hierarchical structure like the 
Russian governing system.  However, uncertainty over issues of loyalty and 
strength also can give pause to ambition. Particularly, as Stanislav Belkovsky 
points out, for those left caught in the middle, like Interior Minister Rashid 
Nurgaliyev: "Very many would dearly like to topple him and take his place….  
[T]here are lots of successors and not one of them is even close to satisfying all 
the factions … The decision-makers do not know who to promote [sic] …." (4) 
 
Last fall, as the extent of the economic crisis began to come into full view, it 
seemed that the most vocal expression of the Russian government about the 
crisis was directed at western economies, notably the US.  This response 
seemed a clear attempt to divert domestic attention away from a focus on the 
Russian government's plans to address the crisis by substituting a viscerally 
xenophobic blame for the economic situation on the outside world.  Putin's most 
noted appearances throughout the fall tended to be accompanied by calls to 
change the economic world order, end the dollar currency regime, and create 
"multi-polarity" (his foreign policy lodestone) in international finance.  This foreign 
policy feint could never have been fully sufficient to divert attention from the local 
repercussions of the crisis, and as 2009 unfolds, stories (and criticism) from 
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Russia's regions are suffused with dire economic details.  The Pikalyovo case, in 
which Putin personally intervened to end a strike that blocked a federal highway 
to St. Petersburg (5), is but one tale of regional woe of the many stories being 
told today, and just one of the countless more likely to come in the near future. 
(For more on Pikalyovo, see "Domestic Issues" below) Putin is not able to 
intervene in person and demand a resolution to problems of evaporating demand 
and consequent job loss.  It is likely that he would soon lose his ability to have 
any impact on events at all, were he even to try the maneuver too often. 
 
Pikalyovo does point in the direction that must present a paramount concern to 
the Kremlin and government leaders:  social unrest.  While mass popular 
uprisings in response to deprivations are neither frequent nor common in 
Russian history, elite wariness of popular discontent is.  As one former Kremlin 
insider has noted, the social unrest in Russia today could be turned into criminal 
activity, perhaps in a form similar to the gray and black market undergrounds of 
the Soviet era (likely with much more significant "protection" this time around).  
(6) However, Putin's regime styled itself as having fashioned order from chaos 
and celebrated the use of the security services to accomplish this. Overlooking 
networks of organized crime probably would be anathema to Putin and his 
siloviki.    
 
Perhaps soon it will be seen as wise to give economically-based social protest a 
form of political outlet. Previous regimes (particularly an outgoing Soviet regime, 
perhaps with strong security services input) have turned to the creation of 
extreme nationalist political groups to siphon off public anger. Unfortunately, 
Putin's political efforts of the past two years (via Vladislav Surkov) have been to 
consolidate political power in a single party unit.  Nonetheless, the "organic" 
sprouting of an extreme nationalist party could provide a welcome diversion for 
any bubbling social discontent.  It also could handily serve as a foil against which 
the contours of a Putin (or Putin-Medvedev) regime would not appear quite so 
harsh.  If pressed, the sudden appearance of a vocal, xenophobic extremist 
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group also could serve as a knout with which to club Russia's few remaining 
liberals for daring to trust in the wisdom of the Russian folk. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) As an "ideological" battle rages over the activities and intellectual product of 
Institutes connected to the Kremlin and Medvedev or to Putin and the siloviki, 
some analysts consider themselves spectators at a demonstration of "good cop, 
bad cop" techniques and suggest the perceived rifts to be purposefully 
organized.  See, for example, "The Tandem's Great Game," by Alexandra 
Samarina, Nezavisimaya gazeta, No. 123, 22 Jun 09 via Johnson's Russia List 
(JRL), 2009-#116, 22 Jun 09.   Of course, there are a wealth of resources also 
analyzing the seriousness of the divide between Putin and Medvedev.  Among 
the more recent, "First signs of competition emerging between Putin, Medvedev," 
- Russian pundit [Dmitriy Oreshkin]," Ekho Moskvy, 12 Jun 09; BBC Monitoring 
via JRL, 2009-#111, 15 Jun 09. 
(2) "Tandem: Come to stay," by Vera Kholmogorova, Vedomosti, #11, 23 Jun 09 
via JRL, 2009-#117, 23 Jun 09. 
(3) See "Putin's men gradually become Medvedev's: An interview with Stanislav 
Belkovsky," by Vladimir Rudakov, Profil, #22, June 2009 via JRL, 2009-#116, 22 
Jun 09. 
(4) Ibid. 
(5) "Pikolyovo 2009," by Nikolai Petrov, Moscow Times, 11 Jun 09 via JRL, 2009-
#109, 11 Jun 09. 
(6) "Cockroach races along the vertical will inflict damage on society and the 
economy," by Vyacheslav Kostikov, Argumenty I fakty, 17 Jun 09 via JRL, 2009-
#116, 22 Jun 09. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
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By Rose Monacelli 
 
Economic update         
Last week, Russia’s State Statistics Bureau announced that the country’s 
unemployment rate had fallen for the first time in more than a year. Surprisingly, 
the statistics indicated that more than 200,000 persons found work in May, 
lowering Russia’s jobless rate from April’s record 10.2 percent to 9.9. (1) Some 
have hailed this unexpected upswing as a light at the end of a very long tunnel – 
a sign that the Russian economy finally is starting to improve after a yearlong 
downturn sparked by the global financial crisis and fueled by low oil prices. 
 
Despite this hopeful sign, all other statistics seem to indicate that Russia will 
remain mired in its current recession for at least another year. The new 
unemployment statistics may represent a positive trend, but the fact remains that 
more than three million persons lost their jobs over the past year. (2) Many of 
those who continue to work do so for lower pay, or for fewer hours, (3) raising the 
question what matters more – the number of persons with jobs, or the number of 
persons who have been able to maintain their lifestyles, despite the past year’s 
economic upheaval. It’s telling that the State Statistics Bureau does not detail the 
kinds of jobs that have allowed 200,000 to move from unemployment, but simply 
reports a lowering of the jobless rate. 
 
In addition to these questions, other factors make it impossible to gauge the true 
depth and scope of Russia’s unemployment problem. Shortly before the State 
Statistics Bureau made its announcement, Russia’s Ministry of Health and Social 
Development announced that it would begin an investigation into the way that the 
government measures unemployment. The State Statistics Bureau currently 
relies on external monitoring and opinion polls designed to reflect the 
International Labor Organization’s (the specialized agency of the United Nations 
that deals with labor issues) standards of employment. (4) The problem with the 
ILO polls is that they leave some room for interpretation, and differing 
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interpretations can produce discrepancies between reported and actual 
employment, as judged by the Health and Social Development Ministry. 
 
For example, according to the Health and Social Development Ministry, 
approximately 2.19 million persons officially have registered as unemployed. The 
State Statistics Service, on the other hand, has estimated that there were more 
than 7.9 million persons without jobs in April. (5) It is possible that many of those 
without jobs have chosen not to register to receive unemployment benefits, but 
the size of the discrepancy between these two numbers casts doubt on the 
figures as presented by each of the agencies. The Ministry of Health and Social 
Development’s goal, therefore, is to work with the State Statistics Service to 
outline new standards for judging overall unemployment figures. 
 
No matter how it is measured, the issue of unemployment and underemployment 
remains a serious concern, especially as the crisis continues and the individuals 
affected slip further below their accustomed standard of living. Adding to this 
problem is the rise in wage arrears across the country. Earlier this month, Prime 
Minister Vladimir Putin traveled to the small town of Pikalyovo, where more than 
400 former employees of three local plants blocked a national highway for more 
than seven hours in protest over mass firings and unpaid wages. The protesters 
claimed to be acting on behalf of the more than 4,000 men and women, more 
than one-fifth of the town, who had been left without an income after the three 
plant owners drastically downsized their operations. (6) 
 
Although Putin accused local and regional government representatives of failing 
to help their citizens, the major target of Putin’s ire was metals tycoon and 
favorite Kremlin target Oleg Deripaska, who owns Pikalyovo’s cement and 
aluminum plant. Deripaska purchased the formerly state-owned plant five years 
ago and defended his actions by claiming that he had over-leveraged his empire 
and was forced to cut costs to stay afloat. (7) 
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The Prime Minister’s unscheduled visit and attack on Deripaska temporarily 
resolved the situation – many workers were rehired and the regional government 
also stepped in, handing out aid packages for those who remained jobless. (8) 
The workers were not entirely persuaded by these measures, however, and have 
threatened that anything less than a long-term solution will result in renewed 
protests. (9) 
 
The speed with which Putin rushed to quell the situation in Pikalyovo might 
suggest that there is a more cynical explanation for the sudden drop in Russia’s 
unemployment rate. Prior to the announcement by the State Statistics Bureau of 
a drop in the unemployment rate, analysts had predicted an increase of 10.3 
percent. (10) Most of this unemployment is concentrated in small towns like 
Pikalyovo, where Soviet-era factories supply products for one or two specific 
industries. These factories are the hub of activity for the unskilled local workforce, 
which is why towns have been hit so hard by the recent drop in global demand 
for Russian commodities. (11)  The concentration of workers in small cities 
scattered through Russia’s regions means that accurate reporting from the local 
level to the federal center is the key to reliable statistics. It is possible that this 
process is susceptible to political pressure. Some believe that, like the anti-
immigration demonstrations that took place last spring, (12) the Pikalyovo 
protests may be a portent for the future, regardless of official unemployment 
figures. 
 
There is no reason to suspect that the government is taking advantage of the 
malleability of its unemployment statistics, but the recent positive news about 
Russia’s employment prospects was well-timed to follow Putin’s announcement 
to the cheering workers in Pikalyovo that “everything will be fine, you'll be 
working.” (13) The question remains whether things have begun to turn around, 
or if this good news is simply part of a preemptive campaign to keep citizens 
calm. 
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Source Notes:  
(1) “Russian economic slide may be slowing, data shows,” Associated Press via 
AOL Money and Finance, 19 Jun 09 via http://money.aol.com/article/russian-
economic-slide-may-be-slowing/395751. Last accessed 21 Jun 09. 
(2) “Fall in Russia jobless rate sparks recovery hopes,” Reuters via The Financial 
Daily, 20 Jun 09 via 
http://www.thefinancialdaily.com/NewsSearchResult/NewsSearchDetail.aspx?Ne
wsId=89302/. Last accessed 21 Jun 09. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) “Data On Unemployment Level In Russia To Be Verified – Minister,” ITAR-
TASS, 17 Jun 09 via Johnson’s Russia List, 2009-#115, 19 Jun 09. 
(5) Ibid. 
(6) Irina Itiova, “Russia's Putin visits town after protests,” Associated Press via 
AOL Money and Finance, 4 Jun 09 via http://money.aol.com/article/russias-putin-
visits-town-after-protests/508339. Last accessed 21 Jun 09. 
(7) Ibid. 
(8) Ibid. 
(9) “Fall in Russia jobless rate sparks recovery hopes,” ibid. 
(10) Ibid. 
(11) “Russian economic slide may be slowing, data shows,” ibid. 
(12) Rose Monacelli, “Population, immigration, and the economy,” The ISCIP 
Analyst, Volume XV, Number 8, The Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology, 
and Policy, 19 Feb 09 via 
http://www.bu.edu/iscip/digest/vol15/ed1508.shtml#domestic. Last accessed 21 
Jun 09. 
(13) “Russia's Putin visits town after protests,” ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services and Armed 
Forces 
 9 
By Fabian Adami 
 
Update: Korabel’nikov circus  
For the last eight months, there has been considerable debate and controversy 
over the status of Russia’s military intelligence unit (GRU), and the future of its 
long-time director, General Valentin Korabel’nikov. In November 2008, reports 
emerged claiming that Korabel’nikov had resigned in protest over the Defense 
Ministry’s planned reform package. Then, in February and March reports 
surfaced, claiming that GRU would be stripped of some of its Spetsnaz and 
strategic intelligence capabilities, that Korabel’nikov would depart the General 
Staff as soon as his deputy was ready to take over, and most controversially, that 
some of GRU’s capabilities would be transferred to the SVR (Russia’s foreign 
intelligence service). Such reports were met with strenuous denials and indeed 
specific counter assertions (namely that Korabel’nikov would remain in office until 
2011). (1) In late spring, the confusion over Korabel’nikov’s status apparently 
was resolved.  
    
On 24th April, Gazeta.ru reported that the General finally had “been retired,” by 
the Defense Ministry, and that President Dmitriy Medvedev had “discharged” him 
formally from military service. (2) According to defense analyst Pavel 
Felgenhauer, although the official reason for Korabel’nikov’s dismissal was his 
age, Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov actually wanted him out of the way so 
that his reform plan could be enacted. The new GRU Chief, General Aleksandr 
Shlyakhturov, is viewed as a “serious” intelligence “professional,” albeit with 
“neither the ambitions nor the influence of his predecessor.” Shlyakhturov 
moreover, is already 62 years old, making him purely a transitional figure, who 
theoretically can be replaced with an even more pliant individual when he 
reaches retirement age next year. (3)  
    
Two further aspects of the GRU story are worth mentioning. The first is that clear 
attempts are being made to mollify the agency in light of the planned cutbacks, 
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with the Defense Ministry publicly at pains to stress that no Spetsnaz trooper 
from a downsized unit will be left unemployed, and further insisting that all those 
affected will be found jobs in “similar units,” which, in turn, are to receive 
modernized equipment and weapons. (4) Secondly, and more interestingly, 
Novoye vremya on 7 May carried an unattributed article claiming that 
Korabel’nikov was being made to pay the price for GRU’s failure to predict and 
prepare for the Georgian “attack” on Tskhinvali last fall. GRU allegedly did not 
“deem it necessary” to analyze a “trifle” like Georgia under Korabel’nikov’s 
tutelage, preferring instead to focus exclusively on the “major enemy,” namely 
NATO and the US. (5) As interesting as this seemingly Orwellian attack might be, 
it is useful to note the terminology used to contrast Shlyakhturov and 
Korabel’nikov: With “neither the ambitions nor influence” of Korabel’nikov, 
Shlyakhturov reasonably can be expected to take direction from political 
authorities with less intrigue and remonstrance. It is likely that Korabel’nikov’s 
removal constitutes a victory for those of the siloviki who have battled for years to 
reduce GRU’s influence and power. 
 
Politkovskaya appeal filed  
On February 17, a not-guilty verdict was returned by the jury in the Politkovskaya 
case. Convictions of the accused had been made almost impossible during the 
trial, largely due to incompatible DNA and fingerprint evidence.  The reaction to 
the panel’s pronouncement was one of universal disappointment and outrage: 
prosecutors insisted that an appeal would be forthcoming, Politkovskaya’s family 
firmly blamed a “half-baked” prosecution presentation for the outcome, while 
some activists claimed that the Secret Services had withheld evidence for fear of 
revealing sensitive information. (6) On 27 May, RenTV announced that 
prosecutors had filed appeal documents with the Supreme Court, asking for each 
of the acquittals to be overturned.  (7) The case was heard on June 25, and the 
verdict was “invalidated.” (8) It will be interesting, if this assumption is correct, to 
watch the government’s convulsions as it attempts to square an overruling from 
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the top with the democratic image that an open jury trial was supposed to 
present. 
 
Borders: Creating de facto realities  
In the last few months, the Russian government has taken concrete steps to 
consolidate the results of last year’s military operations against Georgia by 
deploying Border Guard troops in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  
    
On 30th April, ITAR-TASS announced that President Dmitri Medvedev, along 
with Sergei Bagpash of Abkhazia and Eduard Kokoity of South Ossetia had 
signed a five-year agreement for the protection of “state borders.” For the near 
future at least, Russia will “provide aid” (read troops) to both republics, and in the 
long term, the Russian government has undertaken to create individual border 
protection units for each of the “countries” in question. (9)  
    
By the end of the first week of May, troop movement into the breakaway regions 
of Georgia was in full flow, with the goal being the deployment of enough 
manpower to “fully cover the land border” between Georgia-proper and its 
secessionist areas. (10) No troop numbers have been released yet, but plans 
have been laid to build 20 patrol camps along the South Ossetian border alone, 
as well as the relevant housing and living facilities in Tskhinvali. (11) The 
language used, and the justifications cited for the deployment of FSB troops 
could be described both as outrageous and absurd.  
    
First, in explaining the agreements to the Security Council, President Medvedev 
explicitly linked the issue of border control to the NATO question.  The alliance’s 
planned summer exercise in Georgia amounted to a “direct provocation” of 
Russia, since it would be a violation of the “six principles agreement” that ended 
the conflict last fall:  NATO activities furthermore, would “encourage” Tbilisi in its 
goal of “remilitarization.” (12)  
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The second and most outrageous justification given for the agreement was that 
border troops would facilitate the launching of a new “humanitarian” program in 
Abkhazia: “highly-professional specialists” from the FSB’s Main Clinical Military 
Hospital will provide “free” medical care to those living in the border regions of 
Abkhazia, while educational and scientific specialists will work in local schools “at 
the initiative” of the service. (13)  
   
Finally, in mid-June, FSB Chief Aleksandr Bortnikov claimed that South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia remain huge “channels” for “illegal weapons turnover,” and 
specifically for the arms-smuggling trade into Russia. Bortnikov asserted that 
Security Services had logged 17,000 felonies in the Southern Federal District of 
Russia, i.e. Chechnya and Dagestan between January and May 2009 alone, (14) 
in which militants carried out “armed attacks,” against government officials and 
law enforcement personnel. (15) In order to stem these incidents, the FSB needs 
to seal the smuggling routes in a “reliable” manner. (16)  
    
This is the only one of the arguments made to justify the Border Guards 
deployment that is remotely plausible, given the realities in that region. The anti-
NATO argument likely is a further political cog in the Kremlin’s attempts to equate 
Kosovo with Georgia, while the humanitarian assertions probably are little more 
than attempts to counter the international community’s concern at the lack of 
independent aid allowed into the conflict zones. After all, why should independent 
organizations be allowed in, when the Russian government is fulfilling its 
humanitarian obligations? 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) See The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XV, Number 10 (26 March 09).  
(2) “Russian Military Intelligence Chief Dismissed For Opposition to Reform-
Website,” Gazeta.ru website, Moscow, in Russian, 24 Apr 09; BBC Monitoring 
via Lexis-Nexis.  
 13 
(3) “Russia: Minister Serdyukov Hand-Picking Officials for Key MOD Posts. 
Article by Pavel Felgenhauer titled “Ministry of Defense Ministry of Defense 
Changing its Appearance," Novaya gazeta, 30 April 09; OSC Translated Text via 
World News Connection. 
(4) “Russia: Changing Tack, Leadership Opts For Stronger, Upgraded Airborne 
Troops, Article by Andrei Fedorov: ‘Demobilization Reversed. Russian Airborne 
Promised New Equipment Instead of Cutbacks,” Lenta.ru, 3 Jun 09; OSC 
Translated Text via World News Connection.  
(5) “Russia: GRU Chief Korabel’nikov Dismissed To Make GRU “Face Up To 
Reality,” Unattributed Article: “Military Gambit,” The New Times, 7 May 09; OSC 
Translated Text via World News Connection.  
(6) See The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XV, Number 9 (5 March 09) 
(7) “Russian Prosecution Appeals Against Acquittal in Politkovskaya Murder 
Case,” RenTV, 27 May 09; OSC Translated Text via World News Connection.  
(8) “Court To Hear Appeal from Acquittal Judgment In Politkovskaya Case on 
June 25,” ITAR-TASS, 29 May 09; OSC Translated Text via World News 
Connection.  
(9) “RF, Abkhazia, South Ossetia Sign 5 year Deal To Protect State Borders,” 
ITAR-TASS, 30 Apr 09; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection.  
(10) “Russian Troops Take Georgian-Abkhaz ‘Border’ Under Full Control-
Agency,” Interfax, 8 May 09; OSC Translated Text via World News Connection.  
(11) Deployment of Russian Border Guards To Georgia’s South Ossetia 
Completed,” 11 Jun 09; OSC Translated Text via World News Connection.  
(12) “Russia: Russian Border Troops are Securing Borders of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia Article by Oleg Gorupay on the use of troops of the Border Service of 
the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation to guard the border 
between Abkhazia and Georgia and the border between South Ossetia and 
Georgia. The author notes that, according to the terms of the agreements signed 
by Russia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia on 30 April, Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia "are delegating authority to the Russian side for protection of the borders 
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until they form up their own border services,” Krasnaya zvezda, 6 May 09; OSC 
Translated Text via World News Connection.  
(13) “Russian Security Services Launches ‘Humanitarian Programme in 
Abkhazia,” Interfax, 21 May 09; OSC Translated Text via World News 
Connection.  
(14) “Weapons Smuggling In Abkhazia, S. Ossetia Must Stop,” Interfax –AVN 
Online, 16 Jun 09; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection.  
(15) “Militants in N. Caucasus Still Have Weapons To Commit Acts of Sabotage-
FSB Director,” Interfax, 16 Jun 09; OSC Transcribed Text via World News 
Connection. 
(16) “RF Secret Services Block Channels of Arms Deliveries to N. Caucasus,” 
ITAR-TASS, 16 Jun 09; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Shaun Barnes 
 
Moscow kicks the can on WTO bid 
After more than fifteen years of painstaking negotiations over Russia’s bid to join 
the World Trade Organization (WTO), Moscow’s recent proposal for a multilateral 
accession with Kazakhstan and Belarus may have brought the process back to 
square one.  The surprising announcement, following closely on the heels of 
renewed hope for Russian accession to the WTO, raises a number of questions 
about Moscow’s bid. Preliminary analysis offers economic and political rationales 
for a decision that constitutes an indefinite postponement of Russia’s inclusion in 
the global trade regime. 
 
On June 9th, at a meeting of the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEc), 
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin officially announced that Russia would be changing 
the basis of its bid for WTO accession from an individual approach to a joint 
application on behalf of a customs union with Kazakhstan and Belarus. (1)  
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Belarus’ Prime Minister, Syarhey Sidorski, spoke enthusiastically about the 
prospect of linking the three Eurasian economies and noted the agreement on 
joint accession. (2)  On June 11th, Kazakhstan signaled its endorsement of the 
proposal very directly by officially freezing its own ongoing accession process 
with WTO. (3) 
 
Moscow’s new approach was especially surprising since the prospects for its 
membership had improved markedly with the change of administrations in 
Washington.  As recently as June 5th, the lifting of some of the Bush 
administration’s prior objections to proceeding with accession, as well as new 
progress in talks with the European Union, raised expectations that Russia could 
join the WTO as early as the end of this year. (4)  Interestingly, at the time 
Anatoli Chubais warned that such optimism could be undone by a Eurasian 
customs union, which would have unpredictable effects on Russia’s bid.  Russian 
First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov, perhaps foreshadowing the 
announcement, did not dispel such concerns when he responded by saying “If 
there are real prospects of completing WTO talks, we shall coordinate actions 
with our counterparts (in the Customs Union) and decide what is to be done next. 
Either Russia joins the WTO and we continue our Customs Union plans or on 1 
January we join the Union and continue WTO negotiations." (5) 
 
Chubais must be given credit for his prescience in questioning the impact of a 
move toward a customs union on Russia’s WTO prospects.  To begin with, by 
Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin’s estimate, the union will not be complete until 
sometime in 2011, forestalling its membership until at least that point. (6)  
Moreover, the format of the customs union the three countries plan to create calls 
for regulation only of trade in goods, while WTO rules mandate negotiations 
solely with entities that regulate all trade in goods and services.  Perhaps most 
significantly, while membership by a customs union in the WTO is not precluded 
per se, there is simply no precedent for such a body joining the trade regime. (7)  
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These issues already are creating friction between the WTO’s members—who 
must all approve any new applicant for admission—and the three Eurasian 
states.  After a tense meeting in Geneva on the 17th of June, the head of 
Russia’s delegation to the WTO acknowledged that “[t]he discussion was quite 
tough” and the prospects for quick accession appeared bleak. (8) 
 
Though both Putin and President Medvedev have claimed that Russia does not 
want to abandon the WTO, the practical effect of the move to a multilateral bid 
would be to forestall accession for years to come. (9)  It seems clear that Russia 
places a greater importance on forging economic linkages with its immediate 
neighbors than it does on bringing itself into line with the norms of the 
international trade regime.  While Eurasian countries make up a relatively small 
part of Russia’s trade profile, Russia is the number one source of imports to 
countries like Kazakhstan and Belarus, providing them 38 and 60 percent of all 
imported goods, respectively. (10)  Formalizing and deepening these economic 
ties would help Moscow’s political ambition to rebuild and maintain its influence in 
the former Soviet Union.  Building a regional trade bloc rather than joining the 
WTO also would accord with Moscow’s foreign policy philosophy of multi-polarity 
by raising the prospects for a new, non-Western economic power center. 
 
Additionally, Russia itself has reasons for its reluctance to abide by WTO rules.  
It long has been opposed to US demands that it lower import duties on meat and 
poultry as part of accession – a move that would expose Russia’s agricultural 
industry to stiff competition from its heavily subsidized American counterpart.  
The global recession also may have tempered Moscow’s appetite for trade 
liberalization.  WTO membership would have prevented Moscow from 
undertaking some of the protectionist measures it imposed to defend its ailing 
industries from foreign competitors, such as its increased tariffs on imported 
automobiles. 
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Whatever the rationale behind the recent shift in approach, it is difficult to 
imagine that Russian policy makers believed applying for WTO membership as a 
customs union would not be detrimental to the country’s bid.  While not 
necessarily eliminating the prospect of membership for the three countries 
involved, this approach adds a significant complication to an already complex 
process, almost certainly adding years to future negotiations.  
 
Source Notes: 
(1) “Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan suspend separate WTO talks, to seek joint 
membership,” ITAR-TASS, 9 Jun 09; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis 
(2) “Belarusian premier optimistic about Eurasian customs union,” Interfax, 10 
Jun 09; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis 
(3) “Kazakhstan freezes WTO accession talks,” ITAR-TASS, 11 Jun 09; BBC 
Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(4) “Russia expects to complete WTO talks with EU by year-end,” ITAR-TASS, 5 
Jun 09; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(5) Ibid.  
(6) “Minister expects Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan customs union to be set by 
mid-2011,” RIA Novosti, 13 Jun 09; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(7) The European Union is not quite an exception to this claim, since its individual 
member countries joined the WTO before its accession in 1995 and retain their 
membership status as individual states.  See “Member Information: The 
European Communities and the WTO,” World Trade Organization via 
http://www.wto.org/english/theWTO_e/countries_e/european_communities_e.htm
.  
(8) “Russian negotiator admits consultations on WTO accession not going well,” 
Interfax, 17 Jun 09 via Johnson’s Russia List, 2009-#114, 18 Jun 09. 
(9) Medetsky, Anatoly, “Putin against starting over on WTO,” The Moscow Times, 
19 Jun 09 via Johnson’s Russia List, 2009-#115, 19 Jun 09; “Customs union 
does not mean Russia gives up on WTO ambitions - president,” Interfax, 9 Jun 
09; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
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Russian Federation: Energy Politics 
By Creelea Henderson 
 
Europe sets aside winter lessons come summer 
In January, when Gazprom shut off the flow of natural gas to Ukraine leaving 
European customers downstream in the lurch, Brussels responded with a $4.6 
billion slate of projects aimed at reducing European dependence on Russian gas 
supplies now and in the future. “We need to learn the lessons of the recent gas 
crisis and invest heavily in energy,” said European Commission chief Jose 
Manuel Barroso. (1) Today, as another gas crisis looms, the lessons of winter 
appear to be all but forgotten, replaced on the EU agenda by parochial 
exigencies that have allowed Moscow to continue to dictate the terms of energy 
supply to the continent. 
 
One of the key EU initiatives following the midwinter gas crisis was a proposal 
put forward in March to partner with Ukraine to ensure safe, transparent, and 
predictable transit of natural gas by allowing EU member states to buy gas on the 
Russian-Ukrainian border, while providing grants and loans to modernize 
Ukraine’s decrepit energy infrastructure and eventually double its transmission 
capacity. (2) The joint declaration also foresaw the lease of Ukrainian gas 
storage facilities to third-party customers, so that Europe’s winter gas supplies 
could be purchased ahead of time, during summer months. (3) The plan aimed 
both to enhance European energy security and to empower Eastern European 
countries “by treating them as independent states and not as pawns that are 
organically linked to Russia,” according to Poland’s Foreign Minister Radislaw 
Sikorski. (4) In Moscow, the plan sparked outrage as officials struck out at the EU 
and Ukraine claiming that they were systematically ignoring Russian interests. “It 
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seems to me the document about which we are talking is, at a minimum, ill-
considered and unprofessional because to discuss such issues without the basic 
supplier is simply not serious,” said Russia’s Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. (4) 
 
Recognizing that a plan to upgrade the Ukrainian transmission route would have 
little chance of success without Russian participation, Ukraine’s Prime Minister 
Yulia Tymoshenko approached Moscow in April with a proposal for a joint $350 
million investment in Ukraine’s pipeline to upgrade capacity, which would allow 
Gazprom to move an additional 60 billion cubic meters of gas annually via 
existing routes. (5) But, Moscow rebuffed Tymoshenko’s April overture and 
signaled its disinclination to partner with Ukraine again in May with an 
announcement that Gazprom and Italy’s ENI had agreed to increase the annual 
capacity of South Stream, a pipeline set to bypass Ukraine in 2015, from 31 
billion to 63 billion cubic meters. (6) Once it had established clearly that there 
would not be enough gas to supply both South Stream and Ukraine’s export 
route, Moscow set about shifting blame for perennial gas crises to Ukraine. 
 
In May, Russia began expressing doubt about Ukraine’s ability to pay the $4.2 
billion needed to fill its gas storage facilities in order to ensure winter deliveries 
for EU customers. (7) Ukraine’s underground facilities hold 19 billion cubic 
meters of gas, pumped in during summer months when demand for fuel is low 
and tapped in winter when demand peaks. (8) Under the two countries’ supply 
arrangement, Gazprom sells gas to Ukraine’s Naftogaz for summer storage and 
buys back the volumes to export in the winter. This year, Naftogaz stands to 
suffer heavy losses from the resale as gas prices are predicted to fall in coming 
months. 
 
Although Tymoshenko expressed optimism that a compromise could be found 
after meeting with Putin in Moscow, the Russian side has proven unwilling to 
discuss payment arrangements and instead raised the stakes by announcing that 
Ukraine likely would default on payment due for May gas deliveries. (9) If 
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Naftogaz missed the deadline, Putin warned, Gazprom would exercise its right to 
demand prepayment for future supplies and would cut the flow of gas if advance 
payments were not received. When payment came due on June 7, however, 
Gazprom released a statement confirming that the bill had been paid in full. (10) 
Nonetheless, Ukraine has admitted that without foreign assistance it will be 
unable to afford the cost of filling its storage facilities, and Putin has threatened to 
shut off gas transit at the end of June or the beginning of July if the problem 
remains unresolved. (11) Putin raised the issue with European leaders and, 
throwing the EU-Ukraine Joint Agreement back at its authors, suggested that EU 
member states should shoulder Ukraine’s gas debts to ensure their own energy 
security. 
 
With another gas crisis looming, Europe has shown little patience for Ukraine’s 
financial weakness. Asked whether the EU would provide aid to avert another 
gas crisis, Barroso said “[t]hat is not our responsibility, I should make that clear.” 
(12) Faced with budget shortfalls, the EU has declined to prepay for its winter 
gas and then lease Ukrainian storage facilities as was stipulated in the Joint 
Agreement, a decision that likely spells the end of the arrangement made in 
March. Instead, the EU has appealed to international financial institutions to 
provide Ukraine with stopgap funding, deepening European reliance on Russian 
energy supplies for the foreseeable future. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) “Brussels proposes billions for energy projects after gas crisis,” EUBusiness, 
29 Jan 09 via http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/1233145922.98/. 
(2) “Joint Declaration: Joint EU-Ukraine Investment Conference on the 
Modernization of Ukraine’s Gas Transit System,” 23 Mar 09 via 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/energy/eu_ukraine_en.htm. 
(3) Ibid.  
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&virtualBrandChannel=0. 
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(10) “Ukraine pays its May gas bill, Gazprom says,” AP, 8 Jun 09 via  
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Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Robyn Angley 
 
GEORGIA 
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Challenges without and within 
Spring has presented the Saakashvili administration with several significant 
obstacles, including the threat of renewed Russian aggression, a mutiny in the 
Georgian military, and ongoing opposition protests. The challenges have 
produced a tense mood in Tbilisi, as no one knows precisely how the summer 
will unfold.   
 
The first challenge faced by the government is an external one – the threat of a 
renewed war with Russia. The onset of warmer weather makes the mountain 
passes into South Ossetia and Abkhazia more accessible and raises the annual 
specter of an escalation of tensions between Moscow and Tbilisi, which last year 
resulted in violent conflict and the occupation of portions of Georgian territory by 
Russian troops. A large-scale Russian military exercise, “Kavkaz 2009,” will be 
held from 29 June to 6 July in the Russian north Caucasus. The maneuvers will 
include around 8500 personnel and are comparable in scope to a similar 
exercise held in the same region last year, just prior to the August 2008 conflict. 
(1) 
 
In addition to positioning large numbers of Russian troops on Georgia’s northern 
border, in recent months Moscow has taken significant steps to reduce the 
presence of international observers in the conflict areas.  Prior to the Russian 
invasion last August, the OSCE had been the primary international body involved 
in negotiations over South Ossetia. Earlier this spring, the OSCE mission in 
Georgia fell victim to Russia’s insistence on procuring Tskhinvali’s permission for 
the OSCE presence (i.e. treating South Ossetia as a sovereign state rather than 
Georgian territory); the OSCE mission in Georgia will end on 30 June. 
 
Russian authorities recently took similar steps to remove an international 
presence in Abkhazia. The UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) has 
operated there since 1993. UNOMIG’s mandate was to observe the ceasefire 
between Abkhazia and Georgia and to monitor the CIS peacekeeping force, an 
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essentially Russian operation commissioned by the CIS. UNOMIG’s mandate 
required periodic renewal by the UN Security Council and often proved a topic of 
contentious debate. This last and final round proved to be no exception. 
 
During the latest negotiations to renew the mandate, Russia refused to approve 
the extension, claiming that UNOMIG’s mandate was based on “old realities.” (2)  
Russian officials rejected a formulation of the mandate that maintained Georgia’s 
territorial integrity, (3) while Georgian authorities accused Russia of “remov[ing] 
the international community’s final instrument” for tracking developments in 
Abkhazia. (4)  The Russian veto came despite UN Secretary General Ban Ki-
moon’s strong support for the mission as a means of promoting regional stability. 
(5)  As a result of the disagreements in the Security Council, UNOMIG officially 
was terminated on 17 June. 
 
The withdrawal of these two international missions leaves intact only the EU 
monitoring mission, established with the mediation of French President Nicolas 
Sarkozy in September. EU monitors, however, have been confined to the 
“border” areas of the conflict and have been restricted in their ability to patrol 
within the conflict zones. The absence of monitors in the Russian-occupied 
portions of Georgia raises the prospect of a human rights crisis, particularly for 
the ethnic Georgians in Abkhazia’s Gali region. 
 
The Saakashvili administration also has faced two internal challenges in the form 
of ongoing opposition protests and a military mutiny. On the morning of 5 May, 
approximately 500 members of a tank battalion stationed in Mukhrovani (about 
20 miles from Tbilisi) ceased to obey orders from their commander. (6) The 
ostensible goal of the mutiny was to overthrow the current government. 
According to the Georgian Interior Ministry, the mutiny was coordinated by Gia 
Gvaladze, a former commander of the Defense Ministry’s special forces under 
Shevardnadze.  (7)  A video of Gvaladze and three other men was released on 5 
May by the Interior Ministry. In the footage, the men are seen discussing the 
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assassination of senior Georgian officials and receiving support from Russian 
troops. (8) 
 
Saakashvili, who traveled to Mukhrovani to address the mutinying troops 
personally, linked the rebellion to the NATO exercises that were due to start on 6 
May, to which Russia had strenuously objected, and accused Moscow of 
attempting to destabilize Georgia. 
 
The rebellion was subdued fairly quickly and its leaders, including Gvaladze and 
former National Guard commander Koba Kobaladze, were arrested. 
 
The details of the mutiny – its objective and the precise events of the morning of 
5 May – remain murky. Russian officials have denied any involvement in the 
rebellion and Georgian opposition leaders have called for an international 
investigation into the mutiny. 
 
Though reined in quickly, the mutiny indicates that not all elements of the 
Georgian military support the current administration. Such a degree of discontent 
within a group that consistently has supported Saakashvili could present 
problems in the future if not adequately addressed, particularly in the event of 
further Russian aggression. 
 
The administration’s second internal challenge has come from a loose group of 
political opposition parties that has staged continual protests since 9 April. This 
group includes former officials who have broken with the Saakashvili 
administration, including former Speaker of the Parliament Nino Burdjanadze and 
Ambassador to the United Nations Irakly Alasania. The protesters repeatedly 
have called for Saakashvili to resign over his handling of the August war and to 
hold early parliamentary and presidential polls, due in 2012 and 2013, 
respectively.  Although the number of protesters has fluctuated since the initial 
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protest (numbering tens of thousands) on 9 April, opposition leaders drew a 
crowd of around 60,000 as late as 26 May. (9) 
 
Though the protests have not achieved the goal of setting new elections, they 
have served to raise already heightened tensions in the capital. The political 
discourse employed by opposition leaders is very emotional, and officials and 
opposition politicians frequently exchange barbed comments. Also, protesters 
periodically have blocked the streets of Tbilisi’s busiest thoroughfare, causing 
considerable disruptions in the capital. 
 
The government has made several overtures to the opposition, including an offer 
to give the position of deputy minister within the controversial Interior Ministry to 
a member of the opposition. Opposition leaders generally have rejected these 
gestures, claiming that to accept them would be equivalent to being co-opted by 
the administration. 
 
The administration has met the ongoing internal political challenge with an 
impressive show of unity within its leadership. Last autumn several government 
officials resigned in protest over the war with Russia and a small cadre of 
diplomats joined Irakly Alasania’s opposition political movement. These few 
defections serve to highlight the strength of Saakashvili’s ruling party, however, 
rather than representing its weaknesses. 
 
Though there have been small clashes with law enforcement personnel in the 
course of the protests, the Saakashvili administration has taken pains not to 
allow itself to be provoked into using force against demonstrators, as it did on 7 
November 2007. This measured response to the ongoing protests has prevented 
escalation, but has not eliminated domestic tensions. With no major 
breakthroughs in sight and fears of a renewed war with Russia continuing 
unabated, the domestic political standoff only adds to the tense mood in Tbilisi. 
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ARMENIA 
Ter-Petrosian’s party third at polls, but boycotts council 
The election for Yerevan’s City Council was the first political race for former 
president and current opposition leader Levon Ter-Petrosian since the February 
2008 presidential election. His defeat in the 2008 election spurred protests by his 
supporters (who questioned the official vote tally) and led to a crackdown by 
Robert Kocharian’s government in which eight protesters were killed and many 
more arrested. (The precise number of individuals detained is in dispute. Ter-
Petrosian claimed that 98 of his supporters had been arrested, while the 
government only acknowledged taking 58 persons into custody. (10)) The 
controversy surrounding Ter-Petrosian’s last bid for public office made the results 
of this poll a topic of heightened interest. 
 
In the 31 May City Council election, Ter-Petrosian’s Armenian National Congress 
(ANC) party placed third in the polls, winning enough votes to secure 13 of the 
Yerevan council’s 65 seats. The ruling Republican Party secured 35 seats on the 
council, while the Prosperous Armenia party garnered 17 seats.  (11) The ANC 
announced that it would boycott the council and demanded that Ter-Petrosian’s 
supporters from the February 2008 protests be released from custody. (12)  The 
ANC’s decision to boycott the council may cost the party and Ter-Petrosian much 
needed support in future political contests against the ruling party. 
 
Ter-Petrosian has scored one victory from the elections, however. In an attempt 
to tamp down domestic pressure, President Serzh Sarkisian proposed an 
amnesty that would affect some of the protesters arrested during the 2008 
demonstrations. This move also may reduce international pressure on 
Sarkisian’s administration; Yerevan has come under considerable criticism from 
international organizations for its heavy-handed response to those protests. This 
pressure, in addition to Ter-Petrosian’s demands, prompted the Armenian 
parliament on 19 June to approve an amnesty for approximately 500 individuals, 
as well as to reduce the sentences of an additional 1500 persons. (13) 
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UZBEKISTAN 
Uzbek president peddles contradictory versions of Ferghana Valley attacks 
Uzbekistan’s President Islom Karimov may be about to prove that when it comes 
to government-sponsored misinformation, his government, at least, can have its 
cake and eat it, too.  President Karimov’s administration has reported two very 
different versions of the May 26 attacks in the cities of Andijon and Khanabad 
(located in Andijon Province in the Ferghana Valley).  In one version, Uzbek law 
enforcement officials blamed the violence on Islamic militants who entered from 
Kyrgyzstan, thereby provoking the ire of Kyrgyz border security officials. (1)  In 
the second version, reportedly issued by “Tashkent diplomats” to Russian news 
agency Itar-Tass, the attacks simply were written off as part of an ongoing feud 
between domestic organized crime groups: “It seems nothing serious has 
happened there. There might have been a wrangle between criminals and 
customs officers. The explosion at the checkpoint had no serious 
consequences.” (2)  It was the second version of the story which President 
Karimov chose to reiterate to his fellow leaders at the June 16 Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Yekaterinaburg, (3) perhaps having 
decided that it was time to mend fences with Kyrgyzstan’s President Kurmanbek 
Bakiev. 
 
Nearly four weeks after the attacks, which consisted of an explosion by one 
suicide bomber in Andijon and the attack on the police station on the outskirts of 
Khanabad, (4) it is still quite unclear not only who the perpetrators were, but how 
many of them were involved (estimates of the number of attackers vary from 
three or four to as many as twenty), where they came from and subsequently fled 
to, and how many victims were killed or injured as a result of the violence.  Law 
enforcement representatives initially reported that the attack on a local police 
station was perpetrated by a few unknown “bandits” who crossed into Khanabad 
from Kyrgyzstan. (5)  An anonymous source in the security services then 
informed Russian media agencies that the attackers were thought to be affiliated 
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with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). (6)  A group calling itself Islamic 
Jihad allegedly claimed responsibility for both the Andijon and Khanabad 
incidents, according to the Uznews.net agency’s website.  Islamic Jihad is 
believed to be an offshoot of the IMU and claimed responsibility for attacks 
carried out in Uzbekistan in spring 2004. (7)  The stories of Islamic militant 
involvement are the ones which have received by far the most media attention, 
and the one element that all of these versions have in common is the claim that 
the attackers entered the country from Kyrgyzstan, by slipping past a Kyrgyz 
border checkpoint.  Not surprisingly, these statements have not been well-
received by Kyrgyz officials and since May 26, both the Uzbek and Kyrgyz border 
services have imposed greater restrictions on cross-border travel, as well as 
engaging in a series of tit-for-tat arrests of each others’ personnel. 
 
The Kyrgyz-Uzbek border as it currently stands has yet to be officially recognized 
by the post-Soviet regimes of both countries.  In fact, there has been 
considerable disagreement, and, in some cases, outright conflict over the precise 
location of the border, as well as over whose security services have jurisdiction in 
settlements which straddle both sides of the border.  Kyrgyz villagers in some of 
these settlements recently have accused Uzbek law enforcement personnel of 
carrying out unlawful search-and-seizure operations and arrests.  Uzbek 
authorities, on the other hand, long have complained about the porous state of 
the Kyrgyz border, which, they allege, permits smuggling, terrorism and various 
other criminal activities to penetrate Uzbek territory.  The attacks in Andijon and 
Khanabad have given Uzbek security services an opportunity to bolster their 
presence in the border regions significantly, as well as to exercise much stricter 
control over cross-border travel.  Naturally, this has done nothing to ease 
tensions between the two countries. 
 
Deteriorating relations between Uzbek and Kyrgyz border forces in the wake of 
the attacks may have been what prompted President Karimov’s recent trip to the 
SCO summit.  While at the summit, he conducted a side meeting with President 
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Bakiev, where he resurrected a report that claimed the recent violence was the 
result of a squabble between Tashkent-based crime groups who had been 
competing for profits from cross-border trade. (8)  Whether or not this version of 
events is closer to the truth is almost immaterial – if it helps smooth relations 
between the two leaders and if this, in turn, helps calm tensions along the Uzbek-
Kyrgyz border, it will have accomplished its purpose.  Karimov’s assurances also 
may have been designed to calm any fears harbored by his other neighbors 
about a new eruption of Islamic militantism in the Ferghana Valley. 
 
However, since very few Russian or Western media agencies seem to have 
reported on the Karimov-Bakiev meeting in Yekaterinaburg, it is the Islamic 
militant story that will have the biggest impact internationally, where it will 
undoubtedly elicit Western sympathy, and more importantly, funds and 
equipment, for Uzbekistan’s share in the war against terror – the icing on 
Karimov’s cake. 
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UKRAINE 
Russia and Ukraine play cat and mouse over gas  
For the first time in many years, Ukraine owes no debt to Russia for consumed 
gas.  Consequently, various Russian politicians have had to concoct a new line 
of criticism. This criticism best can be described as the “Ukraine will not pay” 
theme.   Ukraine, Russia’s leaders repeatedly say, will not be able to pay for its 
gas this month.  Which month are they talking about?  Pick one.  
 
The “Ukraine will not pay” theme first arose over Ukraine’s bill for gas consumed 
in March.  That bill was due on 7 April according to the gas agreement signed by 
Russia and Ukraine in January.  “Now, the main problem of Ukraine is payment 
for current supplies of Russian gas,” Gazprom CEO Aleksei Miller said on 3 April.  
“In this context, the most urgent task,” he continued, “is finding acceptable 
sources of financing to pay for the gas that Ukraine consumes.” (1) Miller 
seemed unconcerned that Ukraine had not asked for financing and had said it 
would have no problem paying its bill.  
 
In fact, just one day earlier, Ukraine Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, 
responding to a question from a Russian reporter, had vowed to pay the March 
bill before the due date.  She told a news briefing, “I am pleased to inform you 
that since 1 January, payments for gas … have been made on time and in full:  
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for January in full and on time, for February in full and on time, and all payments 
for March will be made as stipulated by the contract.”  (2) 
 
Ukraine then paid its bill two days before the 7 April contractual payment 
deadline. 
 
One month later, relations between Ukraine and Russia appeared momentarily 
improved, as Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin praised Ukraine’s timely 
payments for gas.  “Payments are being made regularly, without failure,” he said 
during a joint press conference with Tymoshenko in Moscow.  He further 
expressed gratitude for Ukraine’s work to solve any gas disagreements.  “We 
know that the current financial and economic situation in Ukraine is not perfect, 
and we are therefore grateful,” he said, “and we understand this requires certain 
effort on the part of the government, and we hope this will continue.”  (3) 
 
Oddly, however, on the very same day, Gazprom’s Deputy Head Viktor Valov 
claimed, “We are worried about the situation with Ukraine, taking into account the 
low level of solvency and political instability in Ukraine.”  (4) 
 
Furthermore, despite Russian PM Putin’s kind words about steady payments, 
just one day later, Deputy PM Igor Sechin suggested “there has been no success 
so far in achieving guaranteed stability of [gas] transit through Ukraine.”  He also 
claimed that Ukraine’s problems could lead to a “catastrophic development” for 
Europe.  (5)   Clearly, Putin must have missed a memo.  Operation “Ukraine will 
not pay” continued. 
 
To the possible chagrin of Russia, Ukraine then paid its bill for the April gas in full 
and on time. In May, Russia increased the stakes; not only did the country claim 
that Ukraine was unable to pay, it vigorously requested that the EU step in, while 
reaching out to the international media to make its point. 
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On 29 May, European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso said, “Prime 
Minister Putin called to tell me about the difficulties he anticipates in payments 
coming from Ukraine, and to say that Ukraine has asked for some support for 
financing these payments.”  (6)   Barroso then proceeded to respond to 
“Ukraine’s” request for assistance.  “It is difficult with our budget, if not 
impossible, to provide support from the Community budget for Ukraine,” he 
explained, while turning down “Ukraine’s” request. (7) 
 
The problem was that while Ukraine had asked Russia for a more favorable 
payment arrangement, it had not asked the European Commission for 
assistance.  Yet, for a reason that may be clear only to him, Barroso responded 
to a request supposedly from Ukraine presented to him by Putin.  He then 
answered the request seemingly without contacting any Ukrainian officials and 
without determining that Putin’s request was valid.  At least in the EU, the 
“Ukraine will not pay” theme worked well during May. 
 
Around the same time, Gazprom’s Miller announced, “We see the payment 
situation regarding gas supplies in May as very, very grave,” and threatened to 
move toward “100% advance payments.”  (8)  Further, Russian President Dmitriy 
Medvedev explained, “We are ready to help Ukraine, but we would like the EU to 
take a significant role in this work.”  (9) 
 
“Ideas” promoted by Russia during May to “assist” Ukraine in purchasing its gas 
included a consortium involving Russia, Ukraine and other entities to run 
Ukraine’s gas pipeline system.  Additionally, Russia suggested increased EU 
support for the construction of Gazprom’s South Stream pipeline.  Both ideas 
limit Ukraine’s role in gas transit.  These ideas also benefit greatly from any 
perception among Europeans that Ukraine is an unreliable transit partner.  Any 
inability to pay, of course, would suggest instability and unreliability. 
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In late May, Tymoshenko met again with Putin in order to determine the best 
method to fill Ukraine’s gas storage tanks.  The tanks normally contain not only 
gas for Ukraine’s winter domestic gas consumption, but also gas to be used to 
run the turbines/switching stations that propel and transport gas to Europe, and 
gas from some small individual traders that provide gas to Europe.  
 
While Tymoshenko always steadfastly claimed that Ukraine would pay its bills, 
she also made no attempt to hide the fact that the country faced serious financial 
pressures.  As the country with the deepest recession in Europe, Ukraine has 
depended on assistance from the IMF, World Bank, and European Bank of 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to weather the crisis, while enacting a 
number of reforms to attempt to minimize the budget deficit (now conservatively 
forecast for 6%-8%).  
 
In Moscow, Tymoshenko reportedly attempted to either arrange a loan to pay for 
storage gas or reach an agreement that any gas not consumed by Ukraine could 
be returned to Russia.  She also reportedly attempted to convince Russia to pay 
in some capacity for the “technical” gas used to power Ukraine’s transit system.  
Putin balked, as Miller and Medvedev increased the alarm about Ukraine’s so-
called inability to pay.  “Time is running out,” Miller said. (10) 
 
Since gas volumes provided by Russia during winter months cannot fully supply 
both European and Ukrainian needs, one or the other could face shortages if 
Ukraine’s gas needs are not met through stored gas.  According to both Russia 
and Ukraine, 19.5 billion cubic meters of gas are needed in storage as a failsafe 
against winter shortages, and to ensure that the country can power the system 
needed to transit gas.  Ukraine can store up to 32 billion cubic meters, and in 
fact, during 2008, entered the winter with 30 billion cubic meters on hand. It is 
unclear if Gazprom this year has requested that Ukraine store gas eventually 
intended for transit to Europe, and if that gas is to be purchased and then resold 
by Ukraine. 
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Following Russia’s rejection of a new gas storage payment plan, Ukraine’s 
government and Naftohaz appealed to international banks for assistance in 
purchasing gas for storage.  On 23 June, a number of media outlets reported that 
the IMF and EBRD were close to coming to terms with Ukraine on a $4 billion 
stopgap, short-term loan.  (11) 
 
Even without this loan, however, on 6 June, Ukraine paid its bill in full and on 
time for all gas consumed in May.  
 
Further, on 24 June, Prime Minister Tymoshenko assured Ukrainians during a 
news conference that all gas consumed in June would be paid for in full and on 
time.  She also surprised many by announcing that, contrary to Russian reports, 
Ukraine had purchased 1.1 billion cubic meters of gas for storage in June, as well 
as smaller amounts in April and May. (12)   
 
Naftohaz then announced that the country’s gas in storage, including that left 
over from 2008, totaled over 19 billion cubic meters.  It is entirely unclear if this 
figure is accurate, and indeed, it seems high.  However, the presidential 
secretariat, which rarely agrees with Tymoshenko’s cabinet, announced that, as 
of May, the country maintained over 17 billion cubic meters in storage.  (13) 
Gazprom also confirmed that Ukraine had injected over one billion cubic meters 
of gas into storage in June, and had paid for it – a feat that it earlier had said was 
impossible.  
 
At the same time, Naftohaz approached several European countries about using 
Ukraine’s excess storage capacity to store their own gas, thus providing added 
security during the winter months.  
 
Faced with this, Russia one day later expressed deep concern over the 
“disappearance” of eight billion cubic meters of what it said was Gazprom’s gas 
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in storage.  (14)   Ukraine, Gazprom implied, is not somewhere that you want to 
store your gas.  In other words, not only is the country unstable and unreliable, it 
is also responsible for theft. 
 
Naftohaz quickly responded by noting that Ukraine has not stored gas belonging 
to Gazprom since 2006.  “The entire amount of Russian transit gas that enters 
Ukrainian territory is transported to consumers in European countries in full,” the 
company said in a statement.  (15) 
 
For her part, Tymoshenko complained of regular “stormy statements” at the end 
of each month, and urged Gazprom to “be calm” and “get to work.”  (16) Only 
hours later, President Viktor Yushchenko’s chief energy advisor Bohdan 
Sokolovsky held a news briefing to express concern over Gazprom’s “poor 
financial condition.”  This “puts into question stable transit of natural gas to 
Europe,” he said, and urged the EU to examine the situation surrounding 
Gazprom closely. (17) 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) RIA Novosti, 1345 GMT, 3 Apr 09; BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union; 
Political, 3 Apr 09 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(2) UT1, 1134 GMT, 2 Apr 09; BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union; Political, 2 
Apr 09 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(3) ITAR-TASS,, 1629 GMT, 29 Apr 09; BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union; 
Political, 29 Apr 09 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(4) RIA Novosti, 1516 GMT, 29 Apr 09; BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union; 
Political, 29 Apr 09 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(5) RBK-TV, 0800 GMT, 30 Apr 09; BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union; 
Political, 30 Apr 09 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(6) Upstreamonline.com, 1340 GMT, 29 May 09. 
BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union; Political, 7 Apr 09 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(7) Ibid.  
 37 
(8) Upstreamonline.com, 0703 GMT, 26 May 09. 
(9) Platts Oilgram News, 26 May 09 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(10) Interfax News Agency, 1625 GMT, 28 May 09; BBC Monitoring Former 
Soviet Union; Political, 28 May 09 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(11) Bloomberg, 0123 EST, 23 Jun 09 via www.bloomberg.com. 
(12) UNIAN, 1729 CET, 24 Jun 09 via www.unian.net. 
BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union; Political, 7 Apr 09 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(13) Interfax-Ukraine, 0645 GMT, 30 May 09; BBC Monitoring Kyiv via Lexis-
Nexis. 
(14) The Financial, 1056 EST, 25 Jun 09 via www.finchannel.com. 
(15) Interfax-Ukraine, 1857 GMT, 24 Jun 09 via Yahoo News. 
(16) Delo, 16:57 CET, 24 Jun 09. 
(17) Ukrainian News Agency, 1608 CET, 25 Jun 09 via www.ukranews.com. 
 
 
Copyright Boston University Trustees 2009 
Unless otherwise indicated, all articles appearing in this journal were written especially for 
Analyst. This article was originally published at 
http://www.bu.edu/iscip/digest/vol15/ed1513.shtml. 
